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Women’s movements in the Middle East vary in terms of specific historical trajectories 
as well as current ideas and practices. Yet, they are similar in that they share several 
historical and political factors, such as their links to nationalist movements, their links 
to processes of modernization and development, and tensions between secular and 
religious tendencies. Specificities and differences can be found within overarching 
broad general themes, as becomes obvious in the context of two case studies - Egypt 
and Turkey – which are explored in this report. 
 
The analyses of the women’s movements in Egypt and Turkey respectively entail a 
brief exploration of the historical context, i.e. the emergence and development of 
women’s organizations and feminist thought. The discussion of the historical context 
sheds light on its continuing significance in terms of our understanding of present-day 
women’s movements in the region. The fact that Turkey, unlike Egypt, has never been 
colonized is coupled with other historical factors that influence the current parameters 
of feminist discourses and activities. Kemalism and the specific ideology of Turkish 
nationalism employed by the Kemalist regime differs decisively from Nasserist and 
Arab nationalist ideologies associated with the Egyptian state. Yet, in both countries, as 
in many other parts of the region, women’s organizations were co-opted within the 
general strive for modernization and development.  
 
The contemporary context involves a discussion of the specific national political 
topography, which provides the backdrop to present-day feminist activism. In addition 
to questions pertaining to political economy, state-society relations, party politics, and 
legislation, the question of international affiliations and relations is also taken into 
account. The Egyptian women’s movement is particularly influenced by the state’s 
ambiguous role towards women’s organizations, the growth of civil society and its 
severe restrictions (Law 32), the role of the international arena, particularly donor 
organizations, as well the increasing influence of Islamist constituencies. In the Turkish 
case, the women’s movement has been able to work much more closely through the 
existing state structures and institutions, particularly the municipalities.  
The polarization between Islamist and secular constituencies, struggles for 
democratization and institutionalization of feminist activities, as well as debates about 
the Kemalist legacy, appear to particularly impact the Turkish women’s movement.   
 
The comparison between the two case studies suggests that despite differing historical 
and political contexts, women’s movements in both countries have in recent years  
challenged prevailing notions of political culture and institutions. By looking at the 
broader picture and also considering feminist activism in other parts of the region, it 
becomes evident that women’s movements in the Middle East are potential agents of 
democratization processes, yet they are extremely constrained by prevailing social and 




This paper seeks to reflect on women’s movements in the Middle East. Within the 
general context of the region, the case studies of Egypt and Turkey will illustrate two 
specific yet illustrative examples of some of the underlying issues, problems, debates 
and policies, which constitute the backdrop to contemporary women’s activism. The 
two case studies also reveal that specific historical as well as current conditions shape 
women’s movements and partly account for differences within the Middle East. 
 
A critical discussion of the Middle East as a unit of analysis will be followed by a more 
specific analysis of similarities and diversities between women’s movements in the 
region (section I). In section II, the Egyptian women’s movement will be analysed in 
terms of its historical development and current political context, its constituent parts, 
goals and strategies. Specific attention will be given to both, the role of the Egyptian 
state as well as international constituencies in shaping and affecting the women’s 
movement. A similar analysis will be carried out in section III in the context of the 
Turkish women’s movement. This paper will conclude by comparing the two cases, 
which have been explored in greater detail and relating the emerging issues to the more 
general debates about women’s movements in the region.     
 
 
I. 1. Between Diversity and Similarity  
 
II. 1. a) The Middle East and Gender 
 
Any analysis of women’s movements in the Middle East must presuppose some shared 
context and set of concerns among women in an area of considerable diversity; - 
diversity with respect to geography, economic conditions, ethnic groups, social classes, 
religious affiliations, nationalities, and linguistic communities. Middle Eastern women 
and men live in cities, provincial towns and rural villages. Contrary to popular opinion, 
the Middle East is not a uniform and homogeneous region. There is no archetypal 
Middle Eastern woman either, but rather “women in the plural, inserted in quite diverse 
socio-economic and cultural arrangements” (Moghadam, 1993: 10).  
Given this social and cultural fluidity and tremendous diversity, we have to be very 
careful before generalising about women’s movements and gender relations, or 
assuming that they are the same in this complex region. One could suggest, as Judith 
Tucker does, that the diversity of the region militates against any useful generalisation: 
“women’s lives – their access to power and economic resources as well as their social 
and legal standing – surely vary from one community or class to another” (1993: vii).  
 
Many scholars have argued, however, that the diversity within the Middle East is 
underpinned by a certain shared understanding of gender as a social category. Current 
discussions on women in the Middle East continue to invoke Islam as a guide to gender 
organisation, and much of the literature on women in the area still assumes an “Islamic 
culture” that has everything to do with gender. The Moroccan sociologist and feminist 
Fatema Mernissi, for example, argues, in Women in the Muslim Unconscious (1984) 
that there is a certain transhistorical Muslim view of female sexuality as dangerous and 
destructive in its power, in need of close male supervision and control. She therefore 
considers Islam as being responsible for restrictions on women’s lives. However, in her 
later work, Mernissi diverged from her earlier stipulations and now argues that Islam 
was largely distorted by male jurists who wished to attribute to Islam misogynist 
tendencies that the prophet Muhammad did not possess. 
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Whatever role one might want to ascribe to Islam in respect to prevailing gender 
relations, it should be stressed that the Middle East was not, and is not, synonymous 
with Islam. Moreover, Islam itself is lived heterogeneously. And while most Middle 
Easterners are Muslims, there exist differences among Sunni and Shi’a Muslims as well 
as other Muslim groupings, such as the Alawite minority in Turkey. Moreover, women 
belonging to religious minority groups, such as the Maronites in Lebanon, or the Copts 
in Egypt, for example, are generally exposed to very similar, if not the same, cultural 
and social codes and traditions as their Muslim counterparts of the same social class 
standing (Eickelmann, 1998).  
 
Often traditions and customs are not actually rooted in religion per se. The tradition of 
female circumcision is a case in point. Widely practised in Egypt among both Muslim 
and Coptic women, the tradition has its roots in Pharaonic times and is common among 
various countries in Africa, such as Sudan and Somalia, but is not practised in most 
Muslim countries (ibid.). Another often neglected point is the fact that religious 
stipulations are not only mediated by cultural codes but, in most cases, they are also 
interpreted by a male clergy. 
 
Linked to the assumption of normative Islamic traditions and customs which are 
thought to exist all over the Middle East, maybe allowing a degree of local specificities, 
is the notion of strict sexual segregation often perceived in terms of women’s seclusion, 
veiling, women’s belonging to the private sphere (while men are seen to belong to the 
public sphere), sexual modesty and the concepts of honour and shame. As Nancy 
Lindisfarne (1994) critically argues, the notion of sexual segregation, which up to a 
certain point was seen to prevail uniformly throughout the area, suggests the existence 
of a nearly total conceptual and social dichotomy between women and men. However, 
many recent studies have actually challenged the notion of strict sexual segregation and 
a uniform gender ideology. Instead, these studies give evidence of great variations in 
interpretations as well as practices of sexual segregation. 
 
The concept of “neo-patriarchy” has been introduced by Hisham Sharabi (1988) to 
describe different forms of authoritarianism at all levels of society: on the macro-level  
of the economy and the state as well as on the micro-level of the family. While his 
concept certainly glosses over the specificities of post-colonial state formations in the 
Middle East, it has been recognized as a useful tool to consider the various relationships 
between modernity and patriarchy, with a specific focus on the transition from 
“traditional” to “modernized” society (whereby a “modernized patriachy” is labelled 
neo-patriarchal by Sharabi). However, in recent years, the dichotomous thinking of 
“traditional” vs “modern” has been criticized and challenged on many grounds. The 
emergence of Islamist movements, for example, cannot be described as   
“being backward” and looking to the past. Islamist movements, in all their variety, are 
modern phenomenon employing modern concepts related to the nation-state, political 
and economic institutions and the family. Without trying to diminish the restrictive 
nature of much of Islamist stipulations regarding women, it would be a fallacy to 
explain their frameworks in terms of “tradition” and a rejection of modernization. Lila 
Abu Lughod’s provocative analysis of feminist and Islamist agendas in contemporary 
Egypt (1998) reveals a great deal of overlap between secular and Islamist attitudes 
towards marriage, for example, which are based on “modern” notions of conjugal love 
and the nuclear family as ideal.    
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Most scholars working within the Middle East today acknowledge heterogeneity of 
the region and many have suggested frameworks within which to understand broad 
patterns related to women and gender without insisting that they all apply everywhere 
and at every given point of time. 
 
 
II. 2. Women’s Movements 
 
The oscillation between diversity and similarity also holds true for the study of 
women’s movements: specific historical trajectories as well as current ideas and 
practices account for variations between women’s movements in different nation states. 
Women’s movements in the Middle East are similar in that they share several historical 
and political factors, such as their links to nationalist movements, their links to 
processes of modernization and development, and tensions between secular and 
religious tendencies. The combination of “predominantly Muslim societies’ encounter 
with an imperialist West, the flawed nature of agendas for national development and 
the preoccupation with Islam as a marker of cultural identity” (Kandiyoti, 1996: 9) are 
generally perceived to have constrained and restricted feminist discourses throughout 
the Middle East. Deniz Kandiyoti points out that: 
 
 
Something akin to a conventional wisdom concerning the centrality of the ‘woman 
question’ to the politics of Muslim societies has gradually developed. It is based on 
the premise that the emphasis on Islamic forms of regulation, such as the spatial 
segregation and veiling of women, has been exacerbated as a result of encounters 
between Muslim societies and an imperialist West. The identification of Muslim 
women as the bearers of the ‘backwardness’ of their societies, initially by colonial 
administrators and later by Western-oriented reformers, is mirrored by a reactive 
local discourse which elevates the same practises into symbols of cultural 
authenticity and integrity (Kandiyoti, 1995: 20-21). 
 
 
Manifestations of this “reactive local discourse” are the strong identification of cultural 
authenticity with Islam on the one hand and the denunciation of feminist discourses and 
practices as being mimetic of the West on the other hand. Yet, as Kandiyoti points out, 
often ignored in these analyses is the politically contingent nature of the relationship 
between Islam and women’s rights from the post-colonial state building era to the 
present (ibid: 21). This also holds true for the relationship between feminism and 
nationalism which has generally been described as generic and central to Middle 
Eastern women’s movements. What needs to be explored more carefully, however, are 
the historically specific nationalisms and the concrete impact and relationships they had 
on women’s movements. The analyses of the Egyptian and Turkish cases respectively 
will shed light on the distinct trajectories of nationalism and feminism and their 
subsequent and evolving relationships. 
 
According to Mervat Hatem (1993), the nature and development of women’s 
movements in the Middle East must also be viewed in the context of regional and 
international factors. The fact that many women’s organizations in the 1960s and 1970s 
served as representatives of regime policies toward women led to the discrediting of 
these official women’s organizations: “They developed a host of functions, which 
ranged from welfare in Jordan to mobilization and development in Egypt, Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Iraq. Their function and activities were largely determined by the priorities 
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set by the existing regimes, whether it was rational household spending and savings in 
Egypt, birth control in Tunisia, and Iraq, education and training in traditional 
occupations in Syria, labor needs and/or the war economy in Iraq” (p. 30). 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s there is greater evidence for independent women’s movements. 
However, the nature of the specific regime accounts for great variations  among 
women’s movements in terms of their association with or independence from the 
government. In Iraq, for example, no independent women’s movement is feasible in a 
context of general political repression. In Tunisia, independent women’s organizations 
have to be constantly on the guard against state co-option. In Egypt, the state attempts 
to limit the political space, which has allowed the emergence of independent women’s 
organizations. 
 
One factor which has helped the rise of independent women’s organizations is the 
increased influence of international constituencies. Particular consideration should be 
given to the role of the United Nations Decade for Women in encouraging both the 
discussion of women’s concerns and the creation of non-governmental organizations 
(ibid.). This factor will become especially apparent in the context of the Egyptian 
women’s movement discussed below. 
 
The third factor mentioned by Hatem, is the rising tide of Islamism in the region, which, 
in her analysis, “served to push middle-class women to organize themselves in 
opposition to this socially restrictive goals” (ibid.: 31 Yet again, specific historical, 
political and economic factors account for differences between and within Islamist 
movements and their impact on specific women’s movements. There is no doubt, 
however, that Islamists all over the region have brought about a process of reversal in 
relation to women’s rights. As Hatem states, “the Islamists have been successful in 
rolling back some of the gains made by women in precisely those states where the cause 
of women was expected to proceed the farthest, i.e. in Egypt, the Sudan, and Algeria” 
(ibid.: 31-32). 
 
In some cases, the establishment of women’s organizations is not so much a reaction to 
Islamist movements as a response to harsh social, political and economic realities. In 
the case of the Palestinian women’s movement, economic and political factors 
combined led to the establishment of women’s self-help groups which exist side by side 
with more politically or academically focussed women’s organizations. The  Israeli 
occupation and its policies led to an alarming deterioration of the economy as well as 
the supply of key services (ibid.: 34). While these self-help groups refuse to subordinate 
women’s issue to the national cause, the vast number of women’s organizations, 
especially those affiliated with political parties, work within the  parameters of 
women’s issues being secondary to national liberation.   
 
What should have become clear at this point is the fact that despite a series of 
commonalities, specific local realities and demands of women have shaped women’s    
movements in the Middle East, just as in any other region. The analysis of women’s 
movements in Egypt and Turkey will illustrate both, some of the underlying debates, 
issues and dilemmas of women’s movements in the region, as well as reveal significant 
variations among them. 
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III. The Women’s Movement in Egypt1 
 
III. 1. The History of the Egyptian Women’s Movement  
 
Many studies dealing with the Egyptian women’s movement begin their analysis with 
women’s participation on the 1919 revolution and the subsequent rise of feminist 
activism associated with Huda Sha’rawi and “The Egyptian Feminist Union” (EFU) 
founded in 1923(Ahmed, 1982; al-Sabaki, 1987; Ghoussoub, 1985; Hatem, 1986; 
Khalifa, 1973; Philipp, 1978). The EFU’s feminist agneda called for political rights for 
women, changes in the personal status law (especially for controls on divorce and 
polygamy), equal secondary school and university education, and expanded 
professional opportunities for women. its activism was characterized by dynamic 
interaction and tensions between women’s feminism and nationalism. 
 
The development of the intellectual and ideological foundations of the early struggle 
for women’s rights is often attributed to male modernist reformers like Muhammad 
Abdu, Gamal al-Din al-Afghani, and most prominent among them Qasim Amin (Cole, 
1981; Haddad, 1984; Lotfi, 1978; Tignor, 1966). More recent works emphasize  that 
women’s participation in the 1919 nationwide marches, strikes and protests against the 
British colonizers was a continuation and extension of the activities of women in 
previous decades (Ahmed, 1992; Baron, 1994; Badran, 1995).  
 
Women’s contributions to both numerous women’s journals published, as well as the 
mainstream press, encouraged debates on social issues such as education, the role of the 
family, women’s work, women’s rights, etc. The programs advanced by these early 
women intellectuals addressed the nationalist agenda by stressing education, 
productivity and voluntarism (Ahmed, 1992; Baron, 1994). It has been suggested that  
the rise of the women’s press paralleled the emergence of the nationalist movement 
(Baron, 1994:13). 
                                                 
1 This section is based on a larger research project published as Secularism, Gender and the State in the 
Middle East: The Egyptian Women’s Movement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Yet, the relationship between early feminists and male nationalists was far from 
harmonious. It had gradually become clear to many women activists that during the 
nationalist struggle, and certainly afterwards, men’s nationalism had a patriarchal 
character (Badran, 1988: 31). Initially, male nationalists accepted women’s nationalist 
activism (demonstrations, economic boycotts, etc.). However, “after 1919, when 
nationalist pressures emerged in the wake of promulgation of a constitution for Egypt 
women’s political rights were not mentioned. Their equality with men was not 
discussed” (Philip, 1978: 278) 
 
While feminist discourse and activism during the period of post-colonial state 
formation, and even up to the first half of the twentieth century, has repeatedly been 
identified with Huda Sha’rawi’s Egyptian Feminist Union, Khater and Nelson (1988) 
have argued that the women’s movement came of age during the period from 1945 until 
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1959. In 1948, Doria Shafik created the Bint El-Nil (Daughter of the Nile) group  as an 
initiative for a new and invigorated Egyptian feminist movement whose primary 
purpose was to proclaim and claim full political rights of women. It also promoted 
literacy programs, campaigned to improve cultural, health, and social services among 
the poor and enhance mother and childcare (Shafik, 1955:191). The campaign for 
women’s political rights was linked to the campaign for social reforms (Khater and 
Nelson, 1988:470). 
 
Within the atmosphere of general political radicalization2, linked to harsh economic 
conditions after World War II and the obvious inadequacy of the monarchy in dealing 
with the political and economic instability, some women considered the Bint El-Nil 
Union as too bourgeois and conservative in its ideology and tactics. Women like Inji 
Aflatoun, Soraya Adham and Latifa Zayyad, who had adopted socialist or communist 
ideologies, saw the liberation of women as a narrower battle within the more general 
struggle for social equality and justice. They directed most of their efforts toward class 
struggle, grappling at the same time with the twin issues of national independence and 
women’s liberation (Botman, 1987; Khater, 1988). 
 
The state’s vulnerability and regular changes of government set the stage for a diversity 
of political voices; the most prominent of these were leftist forces, which emerged 
alongside Islamist tendencies. Established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, the Muslim 
Brethren (Ikhwan Muslimin) grew rapidly. It took advantage of the Egyptian view that 
the Palestinian struggle represented another western imperialist and Zionist crusade 
against Islamic peoples. Positioning itself as pan-Islamic, anti-western and anti-Zionist, 
the brotherhood attracted increasing support from men and actively sought to increase 
its female membership (Al-Ali, 2000). 
                                                 
     2 The Palestinian national struggle mobilized pan-Arab concerns which shifted 
focus from the national level to an international arena. Between 1944-49, Egypt  
experienced a number of  “minority governments”- splinter groups from the discredited 
nationalist ‘WAFD party’ - which had deteriorating relations with King Faruq. These 
years were characterized by an increased number of more active trade unions, an 
emerging leftist intelligentsia, and the establishment conservative-religious groups. A 
series of strikes took place within the broader movement of demands for social reform 
(Vatikiotis, 1969: 342-44). In addition, the re-emergence of the Communist party 
during the early years of World War II - although weakened by approximately two 
decades of underground dormancy - had a significant ideological impact on Egyptian 
society in the 1940’s (Botman, 1987:17). 
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Zeinab al-Ghazali, who at first looked to Sha’rawi for leadership, left the EFU in 1936 
to form the Muslim Women’s Society. The fast-growing organization focussed mainly 
on welfare work and promoted the study of Islam among women. Its political objective 
was the implementation of the shari'a. Despite Hassan al-Banna’s numerous  
 
attempts to persuade al-Ghazali to incorporate her association into his Muslim Brethren 
movement, the Muslim Women’s Society only joined in 1948 when many members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested (Ahmed, 1992:197). 
 
It is during this period of the 1940’s that the women’s movement took in different 
directions: the aristocratic charity-oriented “ladies of the salon” affiliated with Princess 
Chevikar ; Doria Shafik’s Bint El-Nil,  a mixture between charity, feminist 
consciousness-raising and political protest; the Lagnat al-Shabaat (Committee of 
Young Women) founded by Ceza Nabarawi and Inji Aflatoun to revive the fading 
Egyptian Feminist Union as it attracted “pro-communist women who were prevented 
by the government to establish an organization of their own” (Nelson, 1996:165); as 
well as the welfare and Islamist-oriented “Muslim Women’s Society” created by 
Zeinab Al-Gahzali.  
 
The phase of militant and heterogenous feminist activism of the 1940’s and first half of 
the 1950’s was followed by a period of quiescence. Egyptian feminist activism receded 
under the rule of Gamal Abd Al-Nasser (1952-1970) as a result of the state’s strict 
monitoring of political activism and the banning of any kind of autonomous 
organization. The state monopolized  women’s issues and formulated them as social 
welfare issues, especially through the activities of the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
Nonetheless, the position of women underwent great changes during the Nasser period 
due to the broader commitment to social egalitarianism as women were given increased 
opportunities and rights within the limits set by the government (Al-Ali, forthcoming). 
 
The lack of independent feminist organizations was parallelled by the state’s 
appropriation of women’s issues. Not only did the 1956 constitution and its revised 
1963 version declare that all Egyptians are equal regardless of gender, but labour laws 
were changed to guarantee state sector jobs for all holders of high school diplomas and 
college degrees irrespective of gender (Hatem, 1992: 232). Moreover, in 1956 the state 
granted women the right to vote and to run for political office. The educational system 
was reformed to increase enrolment, both for primary and secondary education, which 
particularly affected female participation in higher education (Ahmed, 1992: 210). 
Mervat Hatem has labelled the state’s formal legal or ideological commitment to 
women’s rights “state feminism”. The term also refers to informal state policies and 
programs which introduce important changes in the productive and reproductive roles 
of women (Hatem, 1993). 
 
However, the impressive accomplishments of the Egyptian state in education, 
employment and social mobility, which accounted for the progressive nature of 
Nasser’s regime, was accompanied by the preservation of the conservative Personal 
Status Laws of the 1920s and 1930s. Hatem argues that: 
 
State feminism under the Nasser regime produced women who were economically 
independent of their families, but dependent on the state for employment, 
important social services like education, health and day care, and political 
representation. While state feminism created and organized a system of public 
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patriarchy, it did not challenge the personal and familial views of women’s dependency 
on men that were institutionalized by the personal status laws and the political 
system (Hatem, 1992: 233). 
 
Under Sadat (1970-1981), the role of the state as social and economic agent of change 
was reduced by withdrawing from the policies of social equality and equal opportunity, 
decentralizing the making of economic decisions and increasing the participation of the 
private sector. Not only were many of Nasser’s official commitments to gender equality 
abandoned, but infitah (open door) policies3 also led to an increased gap between rich 
and poor. Yet, paradoxically, it is under Sadat that the Personal Status Law was 
reformed in favour of women’s rights.  
 
Women were affected in different ways by Sadat’s infitah policies. Their integration 
into the economy, which had been part of Nasser’s  “state feminism”, was replaced by 
high rates of unemployment and inequality of opportunity in the workplace.4 On the 
other hand, labour migration, especially to the Gulf countries, did not only provide 
economic betterment and improved standards of living for many families, it also forced 
many women to take over tasks that were previously carried out by their husbands 
(Hatem, 1992: 238). While a number of women might have gained autonomy as a result 
of the migration of male household-heads, some studies point to the demoralizing 
social and emotional effects of migration on working-class women (Graham-Brown, 
1981; Hatem, 1992). Coinciding with the economic pressures on women, more 
conservative discourses emerged which promoted women’s return to the domesticity 
(Hatem, 1992). 
 
Under the influence of the president’s wife, Jehan Sadat, reforms to the Personal Status 
Law (governing marriage, divorce, custody, etc.) were proposed. The reformed law, 
labelled as  “Jehan’s Law”, granted women legal rights in marriage, polygamy, divorce 
and child custody; it was implemented by presidential decree along with another law 
that introduced changes to women’s representation in parliament. These reforms 
spearheaded a two-pronged strategy of undermining the strength and legitimacy of 
Islamists and demarcating the state’s social agenda from that of the Islamists as a form 
of internal and international mobilization against them. Internally, the state anticipated 
that the reforms would encourage the growth of a secular coalition of men and women; 
internationally, it hoped to use the law as a form of public relations to improve its image 
as a step towards gaining increased political and economic support, especially from the 
United States (Hatem, 1992:242). 
 
                                                 
     3 Infitah did not only constitute the declared economic policy of privatization, open 
market, but its laissez faire undertone also extended into the realm of the government, 
administration, migration, foreign policy etc (Ayubi, 1991:17). In other words, infitah 
did not exclusively refer to economic liberalization, but also entailed a neo-liberal 
reform of the state sector and a realignment of international alliances, i.e. an 
rapprochement with the United States. 
     4 Women were often not hired on the grounds that the provision of maternity and 
child care, stipulated by the progressive laws of the 1950s and 1960s, made their labour 
expensive. 
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However, during Sadat, much like under Nasser, women basically lacked 
independent representative organizations of their own and were dependent on the 
regime’s particular needs. The beginning of the UN Decade for Women in 1975 caused 
the regime, which was searching for stronger ties with its new allies, particularly the 
United States, to promote gender issues. Despite the progressive laws of 1979, the state 
lacked an overall programme to ensure women’s rights and did not encourage 
independent feminist activism. 
 
What should be stressed is that throughout history, Egyptian women activists have been 
discredited by different constituencies by being labelled western agents of colonialism 
or imperialism. The debate over the intellectual origins of the Egyptian women’s 
movement constitutes an ongoing controversy among contemporary Egyptian feminists. 
The debate entails several questions, which are significant for self-definitions and 
struggles for legitimacy among present-day activists. Most women activists today are 
not very much concerned with the question of whether the intellectual origins of the 
Egyptian women’s movement have to be traced back to male reformers or women 
journalists. What is much more at stake today is the issue of whether the intellectual 
roots have to be traced back to “western” or “indigenous” sources. The charge of 
emulating  “western thought” and thereby betraying “authentic culture” has constituted 
a continuous challenge to Egyptian feminists. From its very beginnings until the present 
day various constituencies opposed to the struggle for women’s rights (Islamists as well 
as nationalist-leftists) have engaged in an evaluation of women activists with regard to 
their level of “authenticity”or “westernness”. As elaborated in greater detail elsewhere 
(Al-Ali, 2000), it is these forces which continuously and successfully use the argument 
of “our indigenous culture” vs “western culture” every time gender relations and 
women’s rights are addressed. The “culturalization” of political issues has become so 
naturalized in contemporary Egypt as in many other parts of the Arab world, that it 





III. 2. The Contemporary Context of the Egyptian Women’s Movement 
 
III. 2. a) The re-emergence of a women’s movement 
 
The early years of the Mubarak regime were characterized by a search for stabilization 
and consolidation. In 1985, the Personal Status Law which had been at the centre of the 
debate of the state’s legitimacy, was amended due to strong opposition from the 
Islamists who perceived it to be anti-Islamic. The revised law abandons many of the 
rights that women had attained in the earlier version (Bibars, 1987). A strong women’s 
lobby used the 1985 Nairobi Conference - marking the end of the decade for Women - 
to protest and pressure the government to reformulate the law. Two months after its 
cancellation (just prior to the Nairobi Conference), a new law was passed which 
restored some of the benefits that the 1979 version had provided.5 
                                                 
     5 By creating legal systems that more easily accommodated the conservative strands 
within the Islamic movement, the regime eliminated the sources of legal ambiguity 
through which women were able to manoeuvre in the area of personal status. At the 
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The increased confrontation with the Islamists over the implementation of the shari'a 
(Islamic law) pressured the Mubarak regime to legislate and implement more 
conservative laws and policies towards women and to diminish its support for women’s 
political representation. While Islamist forces continue to constitute a powerful 
constituency of the contemporary Egyptian state6, there has been increasing demand on 
the Egyptian government to adhere to UN conventions concerning women’s rights. 
Economic dependence on aid from the United States and international donor 
organizations (IMF and the World Bank) compels the current regime to present itself as 
abiding by the values and ethos of democracy, human rights and women’s rights - as 
promoted by Egypt’s financial and political “benefactors”.  
 
The re-emergence of women’s activism has mainly been linked to the continuing battle 
over the Personal Status Law and the taking up of formerly taboo issues such as 
contraception and clitoridectomy (Ahmed, 1992: 214). However, in 1985, during the 
national discussion of the Personal Status Law, the already antagonized women’s 
movement) experienced an actual split.  While the Arab Women’s Solidarity 
Association (AWSA)7 defended the law and campaigned to maintain it, the Progressive 
Women’s Union affiliated with the leftist Tagammu party, argued that it was passed 
unconstitutionally by Sadat and should therefore be annulled. In this debate, nationalist 
leftist women, who opposed Sadat’s policies of infitah and rapprochement with Israel, 
could be found in the same “camp” as the Islamists and the Azhar who were enraged by 
the reformed Personal Status Law. This debate very clearly showed the 
“instrumentality” of women’s issues and their submergence into broader political 
questions. What was at stake was not the actual substance of the issue, but a joint 
opposition against Sadat’s general policies. 
 
In an article on feminist activism in the 1980’s, Akram Khater argues that the 
movement was divided into two main camps: Nawal El-Sa’dawi and the Arab 
Women’s Solidarity Association (AWSA) on the one hand and Fathia Al-Assal, the 
head of the Progressive Women’s Union, on the other (Khater, 1987:17). However, the 
narratives of several women activists involved in the coalition formed then, gives 
evidence of a much more broader spectrum and diversified movement than presented 
by Khater. The coalition called “The Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the 
Woman and the Family” consisted of leftists, Nasserists, Wafdists, enlightened 
                                                                                                                                            
same time, the High Court voided the law establishing reserved parliamentary seating 
for women on the grounds of  “preferential treatment”. This move implied the 
re-interpretation of the principle of gender equality as “hands off” policy by the state 
even where inequality in political representation existed (Hatem, 1992). 
     6  Among its many manifestations in public life are the establishments of Islamic 
schools, hospitals, banks and social welfare organizations. In the realm of the “private” 
a growing observance of religious rites and a stress on “Islamic values” has particularly 
effected women (Zaki, 1995).  
     7 In the 1980’s, the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association or AWSA was founded 
by Nawal El-Sa’dawi. The organization was headquartered in Cairo with branches in 
several Arab countries and in some Arab communities in the West (Toubia, 1988). 
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Islamists, women from the Arab Lawyers’ Union, AWSA and other interested 
individuals (Hijab, 1988:32). The committee included mainly  party-affiliates and 
independent organizations, while charity groups have been increasingly absorbed into 
the growing NGO movement. One of the founding members oft the group Al-Mar’ah 
Al-Gidida,  which started as an informal discussion group in 1984, recalled feeling 
alienated by the existing strands of feminism: 
 
 
We had two examples: one was Nawal El-Sa’dawi, the other one was working 
through the parties. As some of us were members of the  Tagammu party, we 
initially tried to work through the party. It really didn’t work. There was 
consensus on issues related to public life, but anything inside the house and the 
private sphere didn’t work. It was a disaster. During the campaign on the 
Personal Status Law we were of the opinion that we should suggest an alternative 
that will grant equal rights. We thought that we could negotiate something. We 
were in the absolute minority. Everyone was involved in this campaign and 
everyone was against us. Initially AWSA hosted it. Later, when people suggested 
that we should rotate, Nawal didn’t want to provide her space anymore. So people 
met in private houses. Anyhow, the momentum was kept for quite some time 
(Summayya D., spring 1996; Al-Ali,2000). 
 
 
The very act of forming an emergency coalition, when the constitutionality of the 
Personal Status Law was challenged in 1985, represents a break from prevalent 
nationalist- and liberal-modernist discourses within Egypt which “only focused on 
women’s rights in the public sphere as part of creating new societies (Hatem, 1993: 42). 
In other words, the hitherto existing frameworks within which “women’s issues” were 
discussed linked the struggle for women’s rights with the reform and modernization of 
society as a whole.  The prevailing perceptions of women’s rights were very closely 
tied to the modernist discourses of earlier male reformers, such as Qasim Amin and the 
more recent development discourses. According to Mervat Hatem, these discourses 
accept “women’s public space, where they were expected to pursue public activities 
like education, work and some form of political participation, especially suffrage” 
(ibid.:40). Women’s rights within the “private” family sphere are not only ignored, but 
also considered as standing outside the legitimate struggle for women’s rights. During 
the post-infitah period, these previously unchallenged premises on women’s rights 
started to be challenged from various directions, even if they continue to constitute the 
most widespread interpretation of women’s rights. 
 
The quote by Summaya D. also sheds light on the debate about the frame of women’s 
activism. The political experiences which gave birth to the attempt to establish 
autonomous women groups in the 1980s are related to the disintegration of the student 
movement, the general crisis of the political left, and the widespread disillusion with 
hierarchical male-dominated political structures. Many women activists did not only 
bring with them leftist revolutionary ideas, but also a disillusionment with the 
possibilities of working with leftist men, especially in the framework of traditional 
hierarchical party or organizational structures.  
 
Many activists within the Egyptian women’s movement view the preparations for the 
Nations’ “International Conference on Population and Development” ( ICPD) in Cairo 
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(September 1994) as a turning point in their efforts to create a feminist platform and 
to move from more research-oriented activism to project-oriented grassroots work. 
Before the ICPD, womens organizations had largely remained isolated from each 
other, except for a few instances of co-operation, which were limited to personal 
exchanges between women from different organizations or the exchange of 
publications. The intifadah, the Gulf War, and the passing of privatization laws, among 
other things, brought the various organizations and groups together for a brief moment 
before they dispersed again to follow their own activities (Seif El-Dawla & Ibrahim, 
1995: 115). 
 
The preparations for the ICPD and the conference itself created space for many women 
activists to address previously taboo topics (abortion, violence, reproductive rights) or 
to discuss issues of common concern (equality before the law, political participation, 
structural adjustment, the Personal Status and nationality laws) with women from 
different political orientations and backgrounds. As Seif El-Dawla and Ibrahim 
describe the time of preparation for the conference: 
 
  
Women started to become interested in subjects, which usually had not been part 
of their agendas. All over the country workshops were organized in which these 
issues were addressed and facts presented.8 These encounters were very fruitful 
and exciting and gave hope for a re-emergence of a movement that was restricted 
for so many years. Organizations met which had not known about each other 
before. Agreements were found in areas where organizations thought they would 
stand alone. At the same time, it became clear that there were some areas in which 
no agreement could be found, like the analysis of the role of the state, the attitude 
towards Islamists, the role of religion and political parties. Women did not try to 
overcome these differences, but respected them. Before and during the conference, 
no one wanted to sell out these exciting and long missed encounters for a 
consensus which would never have been obtained anyhow (Seif El-Dawla, 
Ibrahim, 1995: 115). 
 
 
The feelings of hope and success before and during the ICPD in Cairo were soon 
shattered by a severe backlash triggered by the government, the Islamists and certain 
actors within the NGO movement. Whereas the organizing bodies for the ICPD had 
been very lenient and tolerant with regard to the incorporation of all groups, even those 
not officially registered as NGOs, the government and the nominated organizing 
committee for the International Womens Forum in Beijing, headed by Hoda Badran, 
put lots of emphasis on the legal definition of NGOs and on their registration at the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. This approach had the consequence of excluding groups like 
                                                 
8 Once a group finished its research during the preparations for the ICPD, the 
coordinator of the gender task force organized meetings in different areas (focal points). 
The group which had done the research on a specific topic would present and discuss its 
findings, a process which often led to modifications. In these encounters, Cairene 
women activists encountered women from all over the country and, for some, these 
meetings and debates with “grassroots” women from the countryside and small towns 
were much more fruitful and productive than the usual discussions among activists and 
scholars in Cairo. 
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the New Woman’s Research Centre, which had circumvented the law of association 
by registering as civic companies. The very location of the ICPD had also increased its 
accessibility for activists and groups as they did not have to apply for travel grants as 
was the case for Beijing.  
 
Moreover, the Egyptian government’s  public display of its commitment to gender 
equality was certainly influenced by the wish to “look good” in the eyes of international 
organizations and the world media. It comes to no surprise then that the governments 
enthusiasm dwindled substantially in the aftermath of the conference. At the same time, 
women activists also suffered severe attacks by Islamists, who pressured the 
government to compromise on several issues, such as female genital mutilation, and 
thereby diverged from the expectations raised and promises made during the ICPD. 
During the ICPD, state officials proclaimed their commitment to ban FGM by law in 
the presence of the international community. After the conference, the government was 
challenged by Al-Azhar which had opposed the governments stand throughout the 
ICPD. Backed by the conservative medical syndicate, Al-Azhar pressured the Ministry 
of Health to withdraw their commitment to ban FGM. Once again local traditions, 
culture and religion were evoked to strengthen the Islamists’ ammunition against the 
government, which was portrayed as having given in to western moral codes and ethics. 
(Seif El-Dawla, 1996).  
 
 
III. 2. b) The Law of Association 
 
Despite Mubarak’s official pro-democracy policy, repressive measures have not only 
been directed towards Islamic militant groups and communists, but also towards 
women activists. A number of laws, first established under Nasser, continue to regulate 
the establishment of voluntary groups, associations and organizations under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. These laws oblige women activists to 
operate either as informal groups or as officially registered organizations which are 
subjected to the control of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The approval of the Interior 
Ministry is required for public meetings, rallies and protest marches. The Ministry of 
Social Affairs has the authority to license and dissolve “private organizations”. 
Licenses may be revoked if such organizations engage in political or religious activities. 
For example, since 1985 the government has refused to license the Egyptian 
Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), on grounds that it is a political organization. 
The level of control varies depending on the political climate. It was during the Gulf 
War - a period during which the Egyptian government experienced a crisis of 
legitimacy by aligning itself with the Anglo-American war efforts - that the 
government banned AWSA. Nawal El-Sa’dawi had been very outspoken against the 
war and the Egyptian government’s position on it. The influence of state power on civil 
society organizations through the Ministry of Social Affairs and the apparent 
randomness with which organizations are allowed to operate, is has been restrained by 
the international arena which has largely contributed to the professionalization of the 
traditional voluntary sector (Al-Ali, 2000). 
 
Several women’s groups have preferred to circumvent Law 32 and the danger of being 
dissolved by the Ministry of Social Affairs and registered with the Office of Property 
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and Accreditation as research centers or civic non-profit companies as opposed to 
private voluntary organizations (PVOs) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
thereby avoiding the control and restrictions set by the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
However, this legal loophole has been endangered by recent amendments to the 
ill-reputed Law 32 of 1964.  
 
The banning of AWSA by the government led to the establishment of a coalition called 
“the Committee to Change the Law of Associations”. Its members include the Cairo 
branch of Amnesty International, the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights and the 
Legal Research and Resource Center for Human Rights (Sullivan, 1994: 35). 
One year prior to the ICPD, Egyptian NGOs experienced a breakthrough in their 
tension-ridden relation with the government as the latter recognized and supported an 
elected NGO Committee for Population and Development (NCPD). The ongoing 
ambiguity of the Mubarak regime concerning women’s rights was reflected in the 
flaring up of the continuing debate over Law 32 during the preparations for Beijing 
(ibid.). 
 
Increasing opposition to the Law of  Association, especially on the part of Egyptian 
civil organizations but also international constituencies, compelled the state to declare 
repeatedly that it intended to reconsider the law. An “NGO Forum for Civil Action” 
was formed in the summer of 1998 in reaction to a drafted bill by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. The proposed bill did not meet hopes and expectations of Egyptian NGOs. 
However, the ministry engaged in a series of consultations with the NGO Forum which 
resulted in a agreed upon compromise on both sides. However, in spring of 1999 the 
Ministry of Social affairs sent a bill to the Egyptian People’s Assembly which starkly 
differed from the one agreed upon by both sides. 
 
 
The bill, which passed within days, prohibits associations from carrying out any 
political activities, it increases the ministry’s power to control and intervene in Egypt’s 
civil society, and it restricts regional and international activities. According to a 
statement by a group op Egyptian NGOs, the law, when placed in the current political 
context, is “merely a reflection of the government’s general intention to further restrict 
any form of independent association, be it in political parties, unions, professional 
syndicates, or NGOs.” The newly passes law constitutes a severe blow to Egypt’s NGO 





III. 3. Terrain of Egyptian Women’s Movement 
 
The contemporary women’s movement in Egypt is extremely varied in terms activities 
and institutional frameworks: NGOs with clear structures and decision-making bodies 
exist side by side with more loosely organized groups; ad hoc networks mobilizing  
around specific issues or tasks are formed and dissolved by  activists  who are often 
simultaneously involved in other groups or activities; several womens committees 
exist which are attached to political parties, professional organizations and human 
rights centres; and a number of individual women intellectuals work  independently  
through  their specific profession or are loosely affiliated with specific groups and 





Varying political orientations can be found among independent womens 
organizations, such as “the New Woman Research Centre”, “the Alliance of Arab 
Women”, “the Womens Study Centre: Together”, and “the Daughter of the Land 
Group”. The Alliance of Arab Women, whose members are mainly professional 
upper middle class women in their 50s and 60s, exists on the most liberal end of the 
broad spectrum of feminist approaches, endorsing both welfare work and womens 
rights activism. The Alliance is officially registered as an NGO with the Ministry of 
Social Affairs, the implications of which I  have discussed earlier. Others, like the 
New Woman, Together or the Daughter of the Land Group have circumvented the 
strict regulatory codes linked to the Ministry  by  registering as non-profit companies 
or research centres. These three groups initially grew out of previous political 
activism: members of the daughter of the Land group were initially mobilized around 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982), while the founding members of the New 
Woman and Together had been involved in socialist politics during the student 
movement in the 1970s. 
 
 
In  addition  to these independent groups, which are, to different degrees, involved in  
advocacy,  research and grassroots projects,  there  exist service-oriented NGOs with 
a special focus on the role of women in both development and underdevelopment. 
These NGOs, such as the Association for the Development and Enhancement of 
Women, called ADEW and Appropriate Communications Techniques, called  ACT, 
combine concrete development projects with political campaigns.  
 
By and large, the different women’s organizations as well as individual activists are 
united by their middle-class background and their  commitment to retain and expand 
their civic rights and equality before the law. They share a secular orientation and a 
concern about growing Islamist militancy, but their actual position vis-à-vis the 
various Islamist tendencies and discourses are variable as much as their specific 
understandings and interpretation of secularism (Al-Ali, forthcoming). A great range 
of positions and attitudes towards personal religiosity and observance can be found 
among secular-oriented activists who oppose religious frameworks for their political 
struggles. Generational differences may be discerned concerning a woman’s specific 
attitudes towards secularism and religion, where younger women tend to be much 
more open to the idea of reinterpretation of religion in order to counter conservative 
male interpretations. Older women activists of the generation that was involved in the 
student movement in the 1970s, by and large, tend to be more reluctant to engage in 
religious discourses of any kind (Al-Ali, 2000).  
 
There also exists an increasing number of Islamist women activists who have 
managed to gain voice within the mainstream Islamist discourse as well as criticize 
and challenge their male counterparts for misinterpreting Islam. The most celebrated 
women have remained ambiguous about what constitutes an adequate  role of women 
within an envisioned Islamic state and society: Zeinab Al-Ghazali, the most 
prominent Islamist woman and founder of the Jama’at al-Sayyidat al-Muslimat 
(Muslim Women’s Association, 1924), and Safinaz Qazim, a journalist and former 
leftist who committed herself to Islam in the 1970s. While Al-Ghazali and Qazim 




and private lives within the family (wives and mothers), they have remained 
antagonistic to feminism (Badran, 1994: 209).  
 
A new generation of Islamist women have been more outspoken and confrontational 
about the way they view women’s role in an Islamic state. They stress Islam’s 
compatibility with UN-stipulated standards of women’s rights and point to persisting 
traditions of pre-Islamic times as being responsible for the discrimination against 
women (Ahmed, 1992). Zeinab Radwan, for example, a professor of Islamic 
philosophy at Cairo University and author of the book, Islam and Women's Issues, 
stressed that she would spread her convictions through newspaper articles, in public 
lectures, TV programs and in lectures at Cairo University. In her view, the movement 
of  “tahrir al-mar’ah” (women’s liberation) initiated by Huda Shara’wi only 
addressed issues such as education and veiling, but failed to address women’s rights 
and position in the family, which she sees as clearly defined by Islam. 
 
Heba Rauf Ezzat, one of the youngest and most prominent Islamist women’s activist, 
is certainly the most outspoken in the call for launching of an Islamic women’s 
movement. Feeling closest to the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood, rather than 
some of the more radical tendencies, she clearly expresses her objective to change 
society from within in order to realize her vision of an Islamic state. Ijtihad, the 
re-interpretation of the sources of religion and traditional values and the examination 
of Islamic history are the methods chosen by Rauf to evolve an Islamic theory of 
women’s liberation. 
 
Islamist women activists, such as Rauf, Al-Ghazali and Qazim display great 
differences in terms of  women’s roles within the Islamic state (Karam, 1998). While 
Al-Ghazali and Qazim propagate women’s traditional roles as mothers and wives, 
Rauf ‘s argument that “political authority should be vested in the family as opposed to 
the state” (Karam, 1998: 225), transcends prevalent Islamist notions of the 
relationship between family and state. Rauf attributes a liberating potential for 
women within the realm of the family as well as promoting women’s leadership 
within an envisioned Islamic ummah.    
 
Different positions vis-à-vis the state and political parties cut across women working 
within secular and religious frameworks. Many secular-oriented women, similar to 
Rauf - yet for different reasons -, see the Egyptian state as essentially corrupt and as 
an impediment to their struggles. Others try to work within existing state structures, a 
strategy that has become particularly obvious in the various reactions towards the 
state’s latest encroachment on civil society. Some activists decided to officially 
register as NGOs in fulfilment of the state’s new legislation, while others continue to 
campaign against the restrictive law.  
   
 
 
III. 4. Goals and Activities of the Egyptian Women’s Movement  
 
Most of the goals and priorities of Egyptian women’s movement are related to 
modernization and development discourses. These goals range from the alleviation of 
poverty and illiteracy, to raising legal awareness, increasing women’s access to 




raising “feminist consciousness”. In recent years, some Egyptian women activists 
have systematically put previously taboo issues, such as women’s reproductive rights 
and violence against women, on the agenda. 
 
The problem of violence against women has been one of the most controversial issues 
as it touches precisely the core of what has been side-tracked for so long: forms of 
oppression within the home, within the family. It comes to no surprise then that not 
only conservative and progressive men, but also many women activists themselves 
dismiss this concern as a western imposition, not relevant to their own context. Others 
tend to relativize its significance by acknowledging the problem as such, but pointing 
to more pressing priorities such as poverty and illiteracy. Yet, those activists who 
have engaged in research about different forms of violence against women, such as 
wife battering, rape, physical and verbal abuse have become convinced of the 
urgency of the issue and consequently expanded their campaigns and networks. 
 
The different goals and priorities within the women’s movement are translated into 
various projects: income generating projects and credit loan programmes; legal 
assistance programmes; legal awareness workshops and publications; campaigns to 
change existing laws (particularly the Personal Status Law and the Law of 
Association); the establishment of a female genital mutilation (FGM) task force; 
setting up a network to research and campaign around the issue of violence   
against women; organizing seminars, workshops and conferences to address certain 
issues and raise awareness about them; design and convey gender training packages 
among NGOs; the publication of books, magazines and journals; and the 
establishment of  Women’s Media Watch. 
 
In the context of the Egyptian women’s movement, the very term “activism” glosses 
over a variety of involvements and activities, which, if considered in isolation, are not 
all forms of “political activism”: charity and welfare, research, advocacy, 
consciousness-raising, lobbying and development. Certain forms of activity, such as 
research, might develop into more political engagements, such as advocacy or 
lobbying. Moreover, groups and individuals, at any given point of time, might be 
involved in different kind of activities (Al-Ali, 2000).  
 
One overall problem seems to be the lack of specific institutional targets in many of 
the campaigns which, consequently, tend to become diffused. The translation from 
raising certain issues, suggesting ramifications to actual implementations is impeded 
by both, the states ambiguity and lack of commitment and the women activists 
own failure to adequately retain momentum and display solidarity amongst each 
other. Competition and rivalry - often revolving around the wish to guarantee funding 
and resources, but also in terms of claims to ideological and political truths - 
frequently blocks collective action. In some instances, it seems a legitimate question 
to ask whether some activities remain short-lived because they respond more to 
international agendas than local ones. However, it needs to be stressed that the two 
might not be mutually exclusive and might, if constructively  used, feed into each 
other (ibid.).    
 
Among Egyptian women activists the issue of universality vs specificity of human 
and women’s rights has constituted one of the main debates over the past years. The 




within the context of debates about “authenticity”, “indigenization of knowledge and 
activism” on the one hand, and the adherence to international conventions and 
transnational affiliations on the other. Like the controversy about foreign funding, the 
debate is partly triggered by the growing presence of international organizations in 
Egypt and the increased involvement of Egyptian organizations in international 
forums. Discussions about the universality or specificity of women’s rights are also 
aspects of processes of decolonization in which Egyptian political actors try to define 
their own agendas and aims (ibid.).   
 
The way debates around the new marriage contract, female genital mutilation and 
violence against women developed in recent years make one point crystal clear: 
women activists are not just struggling against general obstacles to womens rights, 
they are also battling against the increased political authority of conservative 
religious forces and a state which is inevitably caught between the demands of 






III. 5. International Agendas and Affiliations 
 
It is important to stress that the flurry of pro-feminist activism during the recent past - 
and articulations of new perspectives and demands on such issues as women’s 
political participation, women’s equality in the workplace, and the more sensitive 
issues of women’s reproductive rights and violence against women – has taken place 
in a context where the government felt pressured by international constituencies to 
prove its commitment to women’s equality. Moreover, resources and people were 
mobilized around both the “International Conference on Population and 
Development” in Cairo (September 1994) and the “International Women’s Forum” in 
Beijing (September 1995). 
 
In some instances, individuals seem to have grouped only temporarily in response to 
funding possibilities generated by international agendas and dissipated after both 
conferences ended. However, some issue oriented networks, such as the “Female 
Genital Mutilation (FGM) Task Force” and a network of organizations working on a 
project concerning “Women and Violence” did not only persist, but also seem to have 
maintained their momentum. These various issue-oriented networks actually typify a 
new organizational form in the history of the women’s movement in that they consist 
of associational linkages in which the various groups maintain their autonomy and, to 
some extent, acknowledge the differences amongst each other. The “Women and 
Violence” project, for example, includes an independent women’s rights advocacy 
group, a legal aid group, a human rights group, a centre for victims of torture and a 
health NGO (Al-Ali, 2000).    
 
The impact of international agendas on women’s activism in Egypt has been 
multi-fold, entailing both positive and negative consequences. The sense of 
competition over foreign funding is certainly one of the negative effects of the 
increased presence of international donor organizations, as it often leads to rivalry 




projects and campaigns are short-lived because they were more a response to 
“available funding” rather than to pressing local issues and agendas. The 
professionalization of the previously voluntary welfare sector and political activism 
constitutes a more complex side effect. On the one hand, it has created a situation 
where careerism could override political goals, which in turn augments the danger of 
rivalry. On the other hand, the professionalization of activities related to health care, 
reproductive rights, legal issues and development, entails greater specialization and 
expertise which has been reflected positively in the quality of various projects and 
publications of contemporary activists (ibid.). 
 
Despite the fact that the struggle over resources presents an impediment to collective 
action and solidarity, and might also give leverage to foreign donor organizations to 
impose their agendas, it has been put to use productively and effectively by some 
groups and individuals to pursue their own goals and priorities. There exist lots of 
nuances in the debate about funding, including a complex ranking system between 
“good” and “bad” donors. Those organizations based in countries perceived to be 
politically less threatening, less imperialist and more progressive in their politics 
towards the Third World are labelled as “good”. Another feature of “good” funding 
agency as opposed to a “bad” one is the level of freedom or control they impose on 
the receiving organization. In other words, those funding agencies which seem to 
respond more directly to the needs of Egyptian organizations without trying to 
impose their own agenda are much more acceptable to most activists.9  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give examples of the range of positions and 
debates around the issue of funding within the women’s movement. But what needs 
to be emphasised is that although women activists are often accused of being 
dependent on foreign funding, the problem is more pervasive and affects all sections 
of the Egyptian NGO movement.  
 
 
III. 7. The State and the Egyptian Women’s Movement 
 
The state is not only far from being homogeneous and static, but its relation to 
women’s organizations differs from context to context. In Egypt, the changing role 
and policies of the state vis-à-vis women’s issues was paralleled by the continuous 
pressure women exerted on the Egyptian state to respond to their demands and needs 
(Hatem, 1992: 348). The Egyptian state poses a threat as well as offering resources to  
the women’s organizations.  
 
A useful conceptualization has been put forward by Connell, who defines the state as 
embodying “gender regimes” and points to the various ways in which the state is 
implicated in gender relations. As he put it, the state is “constituted within gender 
relations as the central institutionalization of gendered power. Conversely, gender 
                                                 
9 On the scale of “good” and “bad” USAID ranges on the far side of “bad”. 
The Ford Foundation has improved its reputation in recent years and moved to the 
centre of the scale, together with UN-related organizations like UNICEF. The 
German GTZ is doing a bit better in its position towards “good”, while the Norwegian, 




dynamics are a major force constructing the state, both in the historical creation of 
state structures and in contemporary politics” (1990: 519). The states power to 
regulate and shape gender relations can work towards the consolidation of existing 
gender relations, but it also has the potential to unsettling the existing gender order 
through reforms (Connell, 1990: 529-531).  
 
The ambiguities inherent in state policies have significant implications for feminist 
politics which has to work both against and through the state, depending on the 
specific nature of the state and its policies. Connell addresses specifically the liberal 
state within industrial-capitalist economies; yet, his analysis of the ambiguity 
inherent in the state’s construction of gender relations is even more obvious in 
postcolonial states. Contradictions, as Kandiyoti argues, emerge in nationalist 
projects which simultaneously reflect portrayals of  women as “victims of social 
backwardness, icons of modernity or privileged bearers of cultural authenticity” 
(1994: 378). In other words, tensions between civic forms of nationalism (which 
describe women as modern citizens who share rights and responsibilities in the 
process of nation-building) and cultural forms of nationalism (which depict women 
as the symbols and safeguards of  “uncontaminated” culture) characterise  
postcolonial state formations.  
 
Nationalism under Nasser, for example, included women as modern actors in the 
general scheme of redistribution, modernization and national development. The state 
under Nasser did not, however, challenge existing gender relations within the family, 
nor did it allow independent womens organizations to articulate their own agendas. 
Within the parameters of nationalist projects in postcolonial states, resistance to 
western cultural imperialism became equated with the preservation of existing gender 
relations, which consequently meant the perpetuation of patriarchal control 
(Kandiyoti, 1994: 388).    
 
The fractured nature of the Egyptian post-colonial state, its changing policies under 
different regimes, its internal divisions as well as its links to international 
constituencies account for women activists shifting relation to the state. Women are 
affected in different ways: they are recipients of state policies (which could be either 
supportive or oppressive) and also try to influence state policies. In this process of 
mobilization at the level of the state, women activists become part of Egypts civil 
society (Al-Ali, 2000).   
 
Connell’s conceptualization of each state embodying as well as creating “gender 
regimes” (1990) provides a useful analytical tool to understand the changing and 
ambiguous relationship between the Egyptian women’s movement and the state.  
Throughout its history, the Egyptian state was actively engaged in constructing 
gender through its policies and legal provisions. The debate about the Personal Status 
Laws is a case in point as it shows the shifting and ambiguous role of the state 
concerning gender relations. The state can be both a means to challenge existing 
gender relations (by reforming the conservative Personal Status Laws and granting 
women more rights with regard to marriage, divorce and child custody), or it can 
reinforce oppressive gender relations (by abolishing the reformed laws).   
 
However, most recent developments indicate that the current state works to obstruct 




apparent in the recent passing of a more restrictive Law of Associations, but is 
evident in a series of antagonistic acts. In the fall of 1999, for instance, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs, opposed Nawal El-Sada’wi’s initiative to establish an Egyptian 
Women’s Union. While the Minister Mervat Tellawi initially expressed her support, 
she later objected to a meeting by organizations working in “the field of women”. 
Among the various reasons cited was that there was “no field of work or activity 
called the field of women”. It remains to be seen how the Egyptian women’s 
movement will strategize and manoeuvre its way out of the impasse created by the 
state. One might speculate that greater alliances will be sought with international 







IV. The Turkish Women’s Movement 
 
IV. 1. Historical Background  
 
Since the late 1980s, we, as women involved in the new feminist movement in 
Turkey, pondered the conditions of womanhood and the mechanisms that 
sustain male dominance. We scrutinized and questioned everything that had 
been taught to us, including Turkish history. As a member of a feminist group, I 
was compelled to search for similar women’s groups in Turkish history. 
(Aynur Demirdirek, 1998) 
 
 
Analyses and interpretations of the history of the Turkish women’s movement have 
to be viewed in context of debates and contestations about the Ottoman and the 
Kemalist legacy. Until the late 1980s, discussions about the role and situation of 
women in Turkey generally focus on the legal reforms introduced by Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk after the establishment of the Turkish state in 1923. It is a widely shared view 
that the reforms associated with Ataturk presented a radical change in the position of 
women and a total break with the Ottoman past.   
 
In more recent years, Turkish feminist scholars have not only challenged the 
assumption that Kemalist reforms constituted “state feminism” which brought about 
women’s liberation, but also attempted to re-appropriate their own history by 
pointing to pre-Republican women’s movements and activists. These studies give 
evidence to the fact that Turkish women began to struggle for their legal and human 
rights after the initiation of the modernization process of the Ottoman empire. They 
“show how women had struggled to be equal citizens with men, had tried to expand 
their social life and space, and had organized to achieve their goals” (Demirdirek, 
1998). In other words, Ottoman women were not merely oppressed, but educated 
women did organize and embraced every opportunity out speak out and challenge 
existing gender relations.    
 
 





Special attention has been given to the writings of women in various journals – 
published by both men and women. The first magazine for women, Terakki-i 
Muhadderat, was published in 1869, and was followed by a number of other 
women’s magazines. The women’s library in Istanbul published a study about  
journalistic writings between 1869-1927, referring to more than 40 women journals. 
These magazines are not only remarkable because they were written and produced by 
women, but their content also points to an emerging feminist consciousness (Tekeli, 
1997: 74). A wide range of demands relating to education, employment, marriage, 
and dress code paralleled demands of women’s movements around the world. 
However, while being supportive and impressed by the women’s suffrage movement 
in Europe, Ottoman women expressed the opinion that it was an untimely and 
inappropriate demand for themselves in light of more immediate and pressing issues 
(Demirdirek, 1998: 73). 
 
Ottoman women’s demands were initially discussed in the framework of Islam, but 
later on women started to raise secular arguments as well. Many of these demands can 
be understood in the framework of the drive for “modernization” which can be traced 
to the Tanzimat period (1829-76). During this time, a dual legal system based on the 
combination of shari’a and European civil law juridicial systems did not affect the 
Islamic personal status code (regulating marriage, divorce and child custody). 
However, the Tanzimat period introduced some modest reforms with respect to 
women’s rights, such as the ratification of a treat to abolish slavery and concubinage 
and the 1856 Land Law granting equal rights of inheritance to daughters (Kandiyoti, 
1989: 130).   
 
The various writings of articles, editorials and commentaries, the establishment of 
women’s magazines, and the publication of the first novel written by a feminist was 
followed by the establishment of a number of women’s organisations between 1908 
and 1920. These organisations differed in their approaches, goals and activities, 
ranging from charitable, culture-oriented to feminist groups. In 1913, women 
organized their first feminist activities, such as a sit-in to force the telephone 
company to employ Muslim women (Tekeli, 1997: 75). After the collapse of the 
Ottoman army at the end of World War I and the occupation of Istanbul in 1918, 
women’s organisations constituted a considerable element of the “national liberation 
front”. There were 16 women’s organisations among the approximately 50 groups 
that were struggling for “the national cause”. Patriotic women’s organisations 
emerged all over the country, but specifically in Anatolia, after the occupation of 
Izmir by Greek troops in 1919 (ibid.).  
 
The period of the weakening of Ottoman imperial power leading up to World War I 
was accompanied by a crisis of Ottoman culture and political system which also put 
“the Ottoman family” on the political agenda: “As a result, women made an 
irreversible entry into political discourse and the question of their rights became a 
privileged site for debates concerning questions of modernisation vs. cultural 
conservatism and integrity” (Kandiyoti, 1989: 127). In other words, contrary to 
general perceptions, the “woman question” was already central to “the different 
ideological and political reactions to the dissolution of the Ottoman empire” (ibid.) 
and did not emerge suddenly with the establishment of the Turkish state in 1923. 
Moreover, the characterization of  Ottoman rule as presenting “traditional Islamic 






IV. 1. b) The Women’s Position in the Kemalist Republic   
 
Factors that favor emancipation […] have been, first and foremost, the modern 
legal system established by the republic, Ataturk’s constant reminders of the 
necessity of giving women full citizenship status, socioeconomic development, 
a falling birth rate, new inheritance laws, the transformations of the extended 
family into a nuclear family, compulsory and free education, urbanization, and 
the extension of communication networks. (Coşar, 1978: 138) 
 
Kemalist reforms were not aimed at liberating women or at promoting the 
development of female consciousness and feminine identity. Instead, they 
strove to equip Turkish women with the education and skills that would improve 
their contributions to the republican patriarchy by making them better wives and 
mothers. With a goal of socioeconomic development, these reforms are hardly 
feminist, and their perception of the role of women and definition of 
womanhood would not qualify them to be taken as “state-sponsored feminism” 
as done by some analysts. (Arat, 1994: 57) 
 
 
Similar to the Egyptian women’s movement, which came to a halt under the rule of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, activities by Turkish women demanding equality and rights 
were co-opted by the regime of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Analysts differ greatly in 
their assessment of the role of the Turkish state in shaping gender relations as well as 
the level of liberation and equality for women brought about by the regime. For some, 
the efforts for reform in women’s status culminated into “state feminism” 
(***Durakbasa, 1998: 139) while others strongly doubt the terms appropriateness in 
the context of Kemalist reforms (Arat, 1994: 57). Whatever position one might take 
in this debate, it can be safely said that a series of laws and reforms improved the legal 
status of women. Most notably, the adoption of the Turkish Civil Code in 1926 
advanced women’s position in the context of the Personal Status Code. It outlawed 
polygamy, gave equal rights of divorce to both partners, and permitted child custody 
rights to both parents (Kandiyoti, 1987: 321). Moreover, women were granted the 
right to vote and to be elected for Parliament. In 1934, they were constitutionally 
granted full citizenship rights.  
 
Yet, only a relatively small number of women were able to use the rights granted to 
them by Ataturk while the vast majority of women were still tied to the land and 
under social control of men (***Cosar, 1978: 138). What needs to be stressed here is 
that Turkey, being a largely agrarian society, lacked both a sizable bourgeoisie and an 
industrial working class (Arat, 1994: 54).  
 
The series of progressive laws went hand in hand with the active suppression and 
oppression of independent feminist activism. The government banned the first 
women’s party and put pressure on the Union of Turkish Women to dissolve, since, 
as the government put it, “women had reached equality with men” (Tekeli,.1997: 76). 
Furthermore, it is now widely acknowledged that Kemalism, although a progressive 
ideology that fostered women’s participation in education and the professions, “did 




conservatism about male/female relations, despite its radicalism in opening a space 
for women in the public domain”(***Durakbasa, 1998: 140).  
 
Indeed, women were encouraged to fulfil traditional roles in their private lives, 
although with a “western ethic” (Arat, 1997: 187). For the vast majority of women, 
participation in the process of modernization meant to adhere to supposedly western 
values of discipline, orderliness and rationality within the household. To this end, the 
government founded a number of institutes and schools for girls and young women 
(ibid.). Only a relative small group of elite women became involved in Turkey’s 
public life and played important public roles. However, despite this dichotomy 
between private and public realm concerning women’s roles and position, the 
significance of Kemalist reforms should not be dismissed. They presented a big shift 
in gender ideology and relations at the time and also constituted a huge blow to the 
Islamist opposition.  
 
As some commentators critical of Kemalist reforms point out, women were 
treated as symbols and tools of modernization and Westernization, rather than 
as the equal partners of men (Arat, 1994: 72). Women were used to distinguish 
the newly established state form the Ottoman empire as well as to prove to the 
West that Turkey was a democratic country. Kandiyoti refers to Tekeli who 
argued that singling out women as the group most visibly oppressed by religion, 
through practices such as veiling, seclusion and polygamy, was central to 
Ataturk’s onslaught on the on the theological Ottoman state (Tekeli, 1981; in 
Kandiyoti, 1989: 127). Tekeli interprets the timing off the legislation on 
women’s suffrage in the 1930s as an important attempt by Ataturk to 
disassociate himself from the European dictatorships (Nazi Germany and 
fascist Italy) and claim Turkey’s rightful place among western democracies 
(ibid.). 
     
While Kemalist reforms are generally equated with westernization, it is 
important to point out that a major influence on Kemalist ideology can be found 
in the writings of the Turkish nationalist Ziya Gökalp. This prominent reformer 
and proponent of women’s rights rejected the conflation of  modernization and 
Westernization. Instead, he developed an elaborate account of an “original 
Turkish civilization” in which “women were equal to men”.  According to this 
view, the decline of women’s status was a result of the influence of the Iranian 
and Greek civilizations. As Gökalp claimed: “Turkish nationalists are both 
popular and feminist, not only because these two principles are values in our 
age, but also because democracy and feminism were two bases of ancient 
Turkish life” (quoted in Arat, 1998: 14).  
 
In the frame of a “Turkish history thesis”, Turkish civilization was 
disassociated with Islam. It was argued that Turks had contributed to 
civilization long before they had been part of the Islamic worlds and the 
Ottoman Empire (***Durakbasa, 1998: 141). It comes to no surprise then that 
the Kemalist state embraced secularization as part of its nationalist project. This 
very specific context needs to be taken into account when analyzing and 
comparing the Turkish women’s movement to other women’s movements in 







IV. 2. a) The Contemporary Context 
 
Ironoically, the coup d’etat in 1960 is often described to mark the beginning of a new 
era characterized by increased political pluralism. Constitutional reforms and 
political restructuring had both immediate and long-term implications for women’s 
political struggles (Arat, 1998: 17). The emergence of new and ideologically distinct 
groups seriously challenged the state’s ability to maintain monolithic ideology and 
monopoly over political mobilization. The military interventions in 1971 and 1980 
and the subsequent resort to martial law and other emergency measures certainly 
impeded the growth of a democratic atmosphere. Nevertheless, the space for diverse 
and competing political groups grew considerably (ibid.).   
  
None of these political groups, ranging form Marxist factions to Islamist groupings, 
explicitly focused on women’s issues and women’s rights, but a number of women’s 
organisations operated as extensions to political parties and movements.  (Kandiyoti, 
1989: 145) Women were used to expand a political party’s electoral base as well as 
for fundraising activities. Young women, particularly university students were 
particularly attracted to left-wing organizations, even though these also marginalized 
women’s issues (Arat, 1998: 18). Overall, women’s political activism increased, but, 
as during earlier times women were only able to operate in co-opted political 
structures. Women’s own demands were defined as marginal or secondary to other 
struggles, such as class struggle or the fight against imperialism (Kandiyoti, 1989: 
145).  “Interestingly”, as Kandiyoti points out, “only Islamist currents accord a 
central place to the position of women, at least at the level of discourse, since they see 
keeping women in their religiously sanctioned traditional roles as absolutely crucial 
to the maintenance of the Islamic social order” (ibid.).  
 
The military take-over in 1980 and its repressive politics had a contradictory impact 
on feminist activism in Turkey. Political antagonisms and ideological polarization 
which marked the 1970s were suppressed through a ban on political parties, imposing 
restrictions on labor unions and the repression of organizations concerned with class 
politics (Arat, 1998: 18). Consequently, the political spectrum was compressed and 
political activism affiliated with parties or older organizations became very limited if 
not impossible. Ironically, the restrictions imposed on general political life by the 
military regime helped to liberate women activists from the straightjackets of 
male-dominated political structures. Being disappointed by their experiences within 
the previously existing political parties and organizations increased women’s 













In 1987 Turkey was a country offering the perplexing spectacle of a sit-in and 
hunger strike by ultra-religious women students demanding the right to don the 
veil to go to classes (a right officially denied) and a small group of feminists 
marching through the streets to demonstrate against violence against women, 
virtually in the same week. While to an outside observer this may seem merely a 
healthy manifestation of political pluralism, the roots of the contemporary 
situation have to be sought in the specificities of the woman question in Turkey 
and of its evolution through time. (Kandiyoti, 1989) 
 
 
The 1980s witnessed the emergence of a new feminism and autonomous women’s 
movement in Turkey. Feminists in the 1980s aimed at a more radical restructuring of 
society than their predecessors. A small group of intellectual and professional women 
– journalists, academics, lawyers, medical doctors etc. – constituted the core of this 
newly emerging movement. With time, they were joined by university students and 
less educated women (Tekeli, 1997: 81). Most women acknowledged that Kemalist 
reforms improved women’s position, but they refused to either subsume their 
demands under broader political movements or to work within authoritarian male 
political structures.   
 
Similar to the women’s movement during Ottoman times, women started to get 
mobilized in small groups revolving around certain themes, projects, or events. 
Unlike other political movements, such as the leftist or Islamist movement, Turkish 
feminists, similar to their Egyptian counterparts do not primarily aim at mobilizing 
“the masses” but focus on strengthening solidarity, and friendly relations between 
women activists. This can be both a source of strength as well as a hindrance as 
personal and political relationships become entangled and occasionally strained by 
this connection. However, in comparison with the Egyptian women’s movement, 
Turkish feminists have been more successful in establishing solidarity networks, 
especially in the context of their campaigns against domestic violence. Overall, 
feminists in Turkey appear to have a greater numerical constituency and more 
systematically approach mainstream institutions to bargain for their demands to be 
met. Similar to Egyptian women activists, contemporary Turkish women have 
rejected hierarchical leadership and tried to implement democratic decision-making 
processes.   
 
The cultural climate of the 1980s was conducive to the emergence of feminist 
journals and magazines, as it is characterized by an emergence of new forms of print 
media that challenged the domination of dailies in building the every day public 
agenda. This new forms of media consisted of widely distributed weekly news 
magazines and popular monthlies which targeted particular audiences, and identified 
“men” and “women” as distinct consumer groups (Öztürkmen, 1999: 277). However, 
as has been pointed out by Turkish feminist scholars, there were tensions between 
Turkey’s academic and activist feminists on the one side, and the ‘popular feminism’ 
promoted by women’s magazines (ibid.: 289). The emergence and development of  
the monthly magazine Kadicina (Womanly) is a case in point. The magazine and its 
editor, Duygu Asena, were recognised for developing a new discourse, using 
innovative and creative techniques as well as popularising certain key concepts and 
slogans associated with the growing women’s movement. Yet, academic and activist 
feminists criticised the consumerist content and approach, most visible in the 





In addition to the more popular media, feminist scholars and activists established a 
number of journals such as Somut (Concrete), Feminist, and Kaktüs (Cactus), which 
initiated debates about and campaigns against ‘battering and sexual harassment’ 
amongst other issues. Many of the women who were involved in these various 
journals did later initiate and participate in various campaigns, projects and activities 
that cumulated into a vibrant women’s movement. For example, in 1983, a group of 
professional women started to come together regularly to prepare a feminist page for 
the weekly literary journal Somut. This project only lasted a year, but helped to “sow 
the seeds of a feminist consciousness among the urban elite in Turkey” (Arat, 1994: 
103). Some of the women involved in putting together a feminist page subsequently 
became involved in the establishment of a publishing service and consultancy 
company called “Woman’s Circle”. Several important feminist writings were 
published by this initiative, which also founded a book club and organized many 
seminars, workshops and discussion groups. The pronounced mission of the 
consultancy company was to support women’s labor, market women’s products, 
improve women’s education, and provide consulting services concerning women’s 
health and legal problems (Arat, 1998: 297). 
 
Within the context of changing political structures under military rule and the rise of 
liberalism, the media became more and more interested in expressions of “private 
lives”. Paradoxically, feminists were able to seize the moment and raise and address 
issues, which had been previously been taboo, i.e. domestic violence, sexual 
harassment and general patriarchal oppression. Personal relationships, and ‘love’ 
featured side by side with more overtly feminist themes such as abortion, violence 
against women and war. However, as Nilüfer Göle cautions that in the post-1980s 
Turkey, the popularity of certain magazines and books did not necessarily reflect the 
level of mobilization around women’s issues:  
 
[…]there formed a sympathtic bridge between the public and the radical movements 
which focussed on issues previously undermined by leftist movements, such as 
environmentalism, women’s identity and individual freedom. A lot of people were 
intersted in, and thinking about the themes promoted by these movements without 
necessarily participating in, or identifying with them. (Göle,1987, quoted in Öztürkem, 
1999: 281)    
 
Despite these reservations, there is no doubt that the 1980’s marked the beginning of  
the emergence of a vibrant and diversified women’s movement. And the various 
magazines and journals edited and written by women contributed in different ways to 
an increasing feminist consciousness. This in turn paved the way for political 
mobilisation and action. Women’s groups in Ankara and Istanbul organized the first 
public feminist event in 1986: they launched a petition campaign to urge the 
government to implement the 1985 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Turkey had signed the convention but 
had ignored the fact that it was far from implementing it. In the following year, the 
first legal street demonstration organized by feminists took place. The demonstration 
against domestic violence expanded into a broader and lasting campaign. During the 
same year, the journal Feminist was published, followed by a socialist-feminist 





In the late 80s, the Turkish women’s movement prospered with different visible 
trends and strands. While local contexts prompted their specific activism, feminists 
were influenced by feminist movements abroad. The transition from military rule to 
democracy and an increasingly vital civil society provided a positive background to 
the growing autonomous women’s movement (Arat, 1998: 296). Feminists had 
created new grounds of discussion in literary and academic journals, initiated 
campaigns against battering and sexual harassment, founded support organizations 
and shelters, and organized discussion groups, panels and conferences (Öztürkmen, 
1998: 277). Yet, in the beginning of the 90s it became obvious that attempts at 




IV. 2. c) Attempts at Institution-Building 
 
Only few of the many projects which were started with enthusiasm in the 1980s or 
1990s lasted longer than three to four years. The main part of activities organized by 
the Turkish women’s movement consisted of ad hoc committees and campaigns with 
flexible organizational structures. Indeed, the majority of feminists had been against 
conventional institutionalization and hierarchic organization. A shift in this approach 
can be first detected among the founders of the “Association of Women Against 
Discrimination” who articulated the necessity for institutionalization in order to 
transform patriarchal institutions and implement CEDAW (Arat, 1994: 104). 
 
Attempts at institutionalization culminated, for example, in the establishment of a 
women’s shelter (The Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation), a women’s library 
in Istanbul, and a consultancy center in Ankara. Independent feminist centers and 
organizatons existed side by side with newly emerging organizations founded by the 
state. On the national level, a Directorate General on the Status and Problems of 
Women was established under the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. At the local 
level, a number of municipalities established departments focusing on women’s 
problems (Arat, 1998: 298). Furthermore, several public universities established 
women’s studies programmes or research centers.  
 
A campaign against domestic violence began in February 1987 in response to a court 
case in which a judge had refused a divorce to a woman who was regularly beaten by 
her husband. Turkish feminists who had already discussed the significance of 
domestic violence amongst each other, protested to the judge and sent petitions to 
court. This initiative then grew into a full –fledged “Campaign Against Beating” 
which was later called “Solidarity Against Beating”. More than 3000 women 
participated in a protest march which received positive media attention. A book based 
on personal accounts of women who had suffered domestic violence was published in 
1988. A year later, 14 feminists founded  “The Purple Roof Women’s Shelter 
Foundation” (Arat, 1998: 300-301). 
 
***Yesim Arat’s account of the history and development of the shelter (1998) reveals 
Turkish feminists’ struggle to work within a patriarchal system by employing 
alternative organizational structures and collective leadership (Arat, 1998: 22). It also 
shows the discrepancy between feminist goals and “male-state approaches” to 




looking at the conditions and events that led women to build shelters and the peculiar 
rules suggested by municipal governments (e. g. requiring the husband’s permission 
to enter the shelter).  
 
The founders of the women’s shelter constantly had to be on guard against co-option 
and annexation of their project by the local authorities. They had been made aware of 
the dangers of affiliating oneself with the state: In another municipality, a women’s 
shelter, which was established under jurisdiction of the political authority, was closed 
down when a more conservative mayor replaced the one who had been sympathetic to 
the shelter (Arat, 1998: 300-303). By trying to keep their independence, the feminists 
involved in the project were regularly accused of being amateurish in their 
non-bureaucratic approach to the establishment and running of the women’s shelter.  
 
The difficulties of pursuing feminist ideals of sisterhood, solidarity, and participant 
democracy within an organization that operates within a largely male-dominated and 
undemocratic political system resulted in internal conflicts and tensions (Arat, 1998: 
22). According to Arat:  
 
[…] feminist aspirations for participatory democracy and decision making 
based on consensus strained the foundation in solving its problems and reaching 
its goals of protecting women from domestic violence. At times, feminist 
principles and aspirations faltered when natural leaders emerged or when 
torturous processes of decision making undermined the goal of sheltering 
women (1998: 306).   
 
Feminists involved in the shelter - as well as many other feminists in the Turkish 
women’s movement – are trying to combine both political activism revolving around 
women’s issues and the attempt to forge more democratic notions of citizenship. By 
the 1990s, the different strands within the women’s movement – Islamist, Kemalist, 
Socialist, Liberal or Radical feminist – stress the need to gain and sustain autonomy 
and an independent identity from existing political structures. Unlike women during 
the Kemalist regime, contemporary feminists do not expect the state to liberate 
women, but protest the state’s restrictive civil rights.  
 
In addition to promoting values and practices of democracy, the liberal and Kemalist 
feminists within the women’s movement also constitute a force which upholds 
secularism in contemporary Turkey. This is not to suggest that all activists in the 
women’s movement are secular. A number of Islamist women also campaign for 
women’s rights by arguing that the Qu’ran proposed equality between women and 
men. However, most Islamist women, as ***Yesim Arat’s (1999) recent study of 
women’s organizations affiliated with the Islamist Welfare Party shows, accept a 
hierarchical system based on a gender-based division of labor. They also do not  
challenge the male-dominated hierarchical structures of the Welfare Party.  
 
Paradoxically, women’s political mobilization through the “Welfare Party Ladies’ 
Commission” has been extremely successful. Arat found  a wide range of motivations 
for women to join the Islamist women’s organizations; among them: the influence of 
friends at school, religious and conservative family backgrounds, and gratitude 
towards the Welfare Party which delivered useful services related to health and 
education (Arat, 1999: 30-36). According to Arat, Islam “has been very functional in 




In other words, Islamist women have managed to provide a political space in which 
women of various backgrounds and with diverse motivations manage to seek 
empowerment, even if the content of their rhetoric and ideology does not entail the 
concept of equality or the challenge of male authority.   
 
The vast majority of those women who constitute the Turkish women’s movement 
are certainly proponents of secularism and perceive Islam to be a threat to 
male-female equality.  The opposition to the rise of Islamism, does not necessarily 
entail a feminist consciousness as the fast growing groups such as “the Association 
for the  Protection of Contemporary Life” and “the Club for Ataturkist Thought” 
reveal. The groups, which constitute a large movement of women of different 
backgrounds, exist all over Turkey. They campaign against Islamist encroachment, 
particularly on their legal rights, but are not feminist in their approach and attitude.  
 





Participants in women’s movements in both countries, Egypt and Turkey, reflect 
similar demographic characteristics, i.e. mainly urban educated middle-class and 
upper-middle class women. In recent years, these movements have broadened their 
bases to some extent while the middle-classes have impoverished under the pressure 
of economic crises and structural adjustment policies. Activities of the women’s 
movements are generally limited to big cities, taking place respectively in Cairo, 
Istanbul and Ankara. Even if the resonance of the women’s movements may travel to 
small towns and villages, the ability of women to connect and communicate with 
each other has been limited.  
 
The Turkish women’s movement has been comparatively more successful in 
moblizing women from a broader class basis. Signature campaigns against 
discriminatory clauses in personal status laws, mass demonstrations against domestic 
violence and the establishment of institutions such as women’s studies programmes, 
women’s libraries and women’s refuges have helped to raise consciousness among a 
broader constituency and have also strengthened solidarity among women activists. 
In comparison to Egypt, the network of feminist activities has been more expansive 
and dispersed, partly because of the existence of institutions such as women’s refuges, 
but also since women’s studies departments have been even established in some of 
the provincial universities.  
 
Unlike the Egyptian women’s movement and the wider NGO sector it is embedded in, 
Turkish women’s organizations have mainly been funded through their 
municipalities rather than foreign funding. In the Turkish case, a multi-party system 
and a relatively strong institutional backing through the state machinery, particularly 
the “Directory for the Problems and Concerns of Women” allows for much greater 
independence from foreign agendas and funding bodies. More significantly even, 
Turkish feminists have been able to lobby and influence mainstream institutions and 
legislation in a context where government restrictions on “civil society” have been far 





In the Egyptian context, the perceived need to “speak for” the peripheral and 
marginalized women in society (instead of “speaking from” their own point of 
departure) accounts for the great concern with issues related to political economy, 
such as the alleviation of poverty, illiteracy and class struggle, as well as national 
independence. Egyptian feminists appear to be much less daring in addressing 
inequalities and issues, which primarily affect women, i.e. domestic violence. These 
differences can be understood by looking at the historical and political context, which 
shaped the development of the women’s movements in each country. Egyptian 
women activists always had to align themselves with nationalist movements - first the 
anti-colonial, later anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist struggles, and could not prioritize 
women’s issues without facing accusations of imitating the West. The Turkish 
women’s movement, on the other hand, benefited from notions of Turkish 
nationalism that were promoted in the Turkish Republic and which equated Turkish 
civilization with the equality between men and women.  
 
It becomes obvious that Turkey emerges as a unique case within the Middle East, 
since the country that has never been colonized. Consequently, as Kandiyoti put it, 
“the dilemma of the emancipation of women in Islam has not presented itself quite in 
the same way as it is in those countries that were former colonies” (Kandiyoti, 1987: 
321). This is particularly crucial since colonizers, such as the British in Egypt, took it 
upon themselves to promote the improvement of women’s position. The somewhat 
paternalistic and patronizing defense of “Muslim women” led to a situation whereby 
women’s dress codes, behaviour and roles have become symbols to measure 
authenticity and independence on the one hand and concessions and imitations of the 
West on the other. This, consequently, very much limits the discursive and political 
space of the Egyptian women’s movement up to today. 
  
There exist obvious similarities between Nasser’s and Ataturk’s policies towards 
women, namely imposing reforms in the framework of attempts at modernization. 
Both regimes promoted women’s rights and equality within the public realm of 
education, work as well as political participation, while women’s rights within the 
so-called private sphere of the family remained a taboo. Yet, an important difference 
between the two regimes was their respective attitude and relation towards Islam, 
which, in turn, shapes the current women’s movements. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
explicitly equated modernization with westernization and the rejection of religion. 
But even the emerging “original Turkish civilization” theory developed by Gökalp 
mentioned earlier separated Turkish nationalism from Islam. Though secularizing to 
some extent, the Arab nationalism, promoted by Gamal Abdel Nasser, never 
promoted such a separation from the majority religion and cultural framework.  
 
The need to look beyond commonly acknowledged notions of feminism and 
nationalism being entangled in the Middle East should have become obvious while 
comparing the case studies of Turkey and Egypt. What also has to be underlined is the 
fact that a close analysis of any given women’s movement reveals a great deal of 
heterogeneity within the boundaries of one country, although they are similar in terms 
of class backgrounds. Aside from relative levels of independence and freedom of 
action, women’s groups and organizations within the Middle East vary with respect 
to their political orientation, their national and international affiliations, their terrain 
of political engagement, and their membership size. Within the groups, individual 




ideological backgrounds and orientations, their proclaimed aims, and their actual 
engagement in activities.  
 
The heterogeneity of women’s organisations and groups within a specific country  
might give rise to the question whether the often disparate forms of action could be 
subsumed under the label “movement”. Some movements are certainly more easily 
identifiable as collective action than others. However, agreeing with Molyneux’s 
analysis (1998: 223), I would argue that the number of women’s groups and networks, 
as well as individual activists in many Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt and 
Turkey, for example, amount to a women’s movement. Moreover, the disparity and 
fragmentation of the women’s movement (in Egypt more so that Turkey) reflects the 
characteristics of many new social movements, such as those for human rights or the 
environment.  
 
As the comparison between the Turkish and the Egyptian case has shown, the role 
played by international constituencies could be overridden by conservative forces 
within. Women’s activism all over the Middle East – and this also holds true for 
Turkey – is taking place in a climate in which women have been the centre of and 
most vulnerable to the “cultural reconstructions” of Islamist discourses, in both their 
moderate and extremist forms. The notion of women as “bearers of authentic values” 
has been a  powerful force in many national and ethnic processes, and (Kandiyoti, 
1991), and holds in all Middle Eastern countries. However, the perception of women 
as bearers of authentic values is not only significant in Islamist discourses, but also in 
discourses of secular nationalists and leftists. 
 
Informed by examples from the Egyptian and Turkish cases, one can deduce that 
women’s movements in the Middle East are challenged to work with or through  state 
structures which at times could be conducive and at other times impeding women’s 
activism. Women’s movements fluctuate between adherence and opposition to 
existing structures, occasionally trying manoeuvre and expand political spaces but 
rarely rejecting the system in its totality. A “residual acceptance of what the system 
offers and the reorientation of prevailing structures and discourses” (Arat, 1998: 31) 
seem to be the strategy followed by Turkish and Egyptian women alike. It is within 
the fluctuation of confrontation and co-operation (with the state, as well as national 
and  international political constituencies) that women’s movements could 
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